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This paper examines what influences Russian households‟ decisions to save and borrow. 
We use the 2008 data from the 17th round of the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey 
(RLMS-HSE). Our results show that the determinants of saving and borrowing are not only 
those suggested by economic theory but also include psychological and sociological con-
siderations: smarter respondents, who are satisfied with their lives and inclined to help 
other people, are more likely to save. Those who enjoy stable or improving financial condi-
tions and/or are satisfied with them are more likely to save and less likely to borrow. Fi-
nancial literacy, a factor cited by institutional theory as positive for both saving and bor-
rowing from banks, lost its significance at the onset of the financial crisis. Household in-
come, suggested by economic theory as a basis for choosing a financial strategy, was found 
to have much less influence on savings and to have a positive influence on borrowing, con-
firming the rationing theory rather than inter-temporal choice theory. Surprisingly, the fear 
of job loss does not make people save more, contrary to the precautionary motive. 
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Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan kotitalouksien säästämiseen ja lainanottoon vaikuttavia teki-
jöitä Venäjällä tuoreen poikkileikkausaineiston avulla. Tulokset korostavat psykologisten 
ja sosiologisten tekijöiden merkitystä kotitalouksien päätöksenteossa. Elinoloihinsa tyyty-
väiset vastaajat säästävät muita useammin. Kotitalouksien tuloilla oli vain vähän vaikutusta 
säästämiseen,  mutta  positiivinen  vaikutus  lainanottoon.  Vastoin  odotuksia  epävarmuus 
työpaikasta ei lisännyt kotitalouksien säästämistä.  
 
JEL:D14, D91, G21 
 
Asiasanat: kotitaloudet, Venäjä, säästäminen, lainanotto  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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1  Introduction 
 
Consideration of what determines household financial strategies is not new in economic 
theory. As the OECD report (2002) suggests, “…as one of the key variables determining 
individual welfare and quality of life, consumption has dominated much of the microeco-
nomic debate dating back to John Stuart Mill and the classical economists of the 18th and 
19th centuries.” (p.61). Two financial strategies related to consumption optimization over 
time  are  usually  analyzed  starting  with  the  first  models  of  households‟  inter-temporal 
choice. Having the possibility to store financial assets and to access the credit market, a 
household chooses a borrower or saver strategy.  
These two strategies at least partly ensure the efficiency of banking-system trans-
mission mechanisms. A lack of savings undermines the flow of funds into bank deposits. 
Low demand for bank loans and dominance of loans from private third parties reduce 
banks‟ profits and diversification possibilities even if the market is not affected by the 
problem of credit rationing.    
In this paper we aim to determine the factors that influence Russian households‟ 
decisions on whether to save and/or borrow. In respect of those who choose one of these 
strategies, we analyze the determinants of exposure to the strategy, namely, the amount of 
funds saved or borrowed. We use the 2008 cross-section survey data from the 17
th round of 
the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS-HSE). Because this round took place 
in late 2008, we also examine financial strategies at the start of the financial crisis. 
According to standard inter-temporal theory, saving and borrowing depend on the 
household‟s current income, expected future income and the rate of inter-temporal prefer-
ence (discount rate). The equilibrium amounts of savings and borrowing comprise the solu-
tion of a utility maximization problem with an inter-temporal budget constraint. Thus bor-
rowing and saving serve to smoothen consumption over time. However, the literature goes 
beyond this theory to add other influences on household decisions as to how much to save 
or borrow.  
Initially these factors were tested with macro-data. For example, the determinants 
of savings in OECD countries (1975-1995) are analyzed in Callen and Thiman (1997), who 
use macro-data and focus primarily on the influence of social security and welfare systems 
on the ratio of household savings to GDP. Besides showing that direct taxes and govern-
ment transfers have negative impacts on saving, they demonstrate that income has a posi-Maria Semenova   Save or borrow -  
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tive effect and unemployment a negative effect (so that no precautionary savings effect 
was found). Loayza et al (2000) present an overview of several studies relating to private 
savings in developing countries, all of which are based on macro-data. The results suggest 
that income has a positive effect on savings; the influence of age is U-shaped; and uncer-
tainty (measured by inflation or urbanization variables – for rural areas the uncertainty is 
considered  to  be  higher)  provides  additional  incentive  to  save.  An  earlier  paper  by 
Schmidt-Hebbel et al (1992) presents evidence on household saving determinants in ten 
developing countries in 1970-1985. They find a positive influence for income but not for 
inflation. 
However, moving from the life-cycle or permanent income hypothesis to studying 
the influence of personal and psychological characteristics (Thaler, 1990, 1994) as well as 
social and institutional factors (Han, Sherraden, 2009) complicates the empirical testing of 
aggregated macro-data. As suggested by Deaton (1997), Miles (1997) and many others, to 
probe deeper into household motivation one needs to switch from macro-level to individ-
ual-level or household-level data (surveys or personal files). This type of data enables one 
to control for personal, social and institutional factors. An example of such a study is Har-
ris et al (1999), which studies the determinants of saving in Australia using household sur-
vey data and examines the risk-aversion motive for saving. These results confirm the pre-
cautionary motive, showing that respondents who are pessimistic or uncertain about future 
incomes save more. The authors also provide some evidence for the relative income hy-
pothesis by showing that social factors are important and that higher relative income leads 
to higher savings. Webley and Nyhus (2006), using data from Dutch household surveys, 
demonstrate that social factors and the environment in which a person grows up strongly 
influence his incentive to save. For instance, parents‟ saving habits and living principles 
are statistically significant for their children‟s savings. Even genetic factors proved to exert 
an influence on financial strategies. Based on data on Swedish twins, Barnea, Cronqvist 
and Siegel (2010) show that even if they grow up in different environments and have dif-
ferent life experiences a pair of twins will have similar investment strategies.  Han and 
Sherraden (2009) provide evidence that institutional factors may stimulate savings and that 
financial education/literacy is among the most important determinants of savings (at least 
for lower-income households in the Individual Development Account program). 
There are relatively few papers that bring to light peculiarities of saving determi-
nants in transition economies. Denizer et al (2002) analyze determinants of savings in Bul-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 28/ 2011 
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garia, Hungary and Poland, using survey data. They find a positive – albeit rather small – 
linear influence of age (in contrast to the U-shaped relationship for developed and develop-
ing countries). Employment is not highly significant, and the education of the head of 
household has a negative effect on the propensity to save.  Kulikov et al (2007) analyze the 
determinants of household savings in Estonia and find some income and wealth effects, eg 
that higher income increases savings whereas holdings of durables and financial assets re-
duce them. The latter is shown to be true for Russian households by Foley and Pyle (2005) 
who also show that savings are sensitive to transitory income, measured as income from 
household production and private transfers. The savings of Russian households also seem 
to be based on a precautionary savings motive. The probability of the head of household 
being fired stimulates saving, as Guariglia and Kim (2001) show using data for 1994-2000, 
which was a period of political, economic and institutional instability in Russia.          
One of the problems in credit markets, which pushes them away from the inter-
temporal choice model equilibria, is liquidity constraints due to credit rationing, as sug-
gested by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Most of the papers dealing with the determinants of 
borrowing behavior analyze bank loans and concentrate on credit rationing factors and li-
quidity constraints (see Magri (2007) for an overview of this literature). 
An exception is Diagne (1999), who analyses both formal and informal credit 
markets in Malawi, though focusing on credit constraint determinants (based on the 1995 
survey of rural households participating in special microcredit programs). It is shown that 
formal and informal credit markets are not substitutes for each other but instead serve dif-
ferent purposes (investment and personal use respectively).    
Also in contrast to many others, Magri (2007) clearly differentiates between de-
mand (households willing to apply) and supply (households that apply but are rejected) 
factors for household debt in Italy. Using the results of household surveys, she demon-
strates that age is a demand factor that increases the probability of becoming a borrower (at 
least up to a certain point). However, household income, which has a similar influence, 
seems to be a supply factor. The latter is true for the amount borrowed.  
The literature on borrowing does not take account of a wide range of factors dis-
cussed in the savings literature, such as personal and psychological characteristics, self-
esteem and social status, and financial literacy.     
Our study adds to these two streams of literature in the following ways. First, we 
analyze the  choice between two types  of financial strategies,  rather than concentrating Maria Semenova   Save or borrow -  
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solely on saving or borrowing behavior. This allows us to analyze households‟ motivations 
for involvement in the financial markets. 
Secondly, we go beyond income and wealth analysis, which are performed by 
other authors dealing with Russian data. We include households‟ expectations and self-
esteem among the factors that may influence their choices. In fact, the household may not 
save and may be out of the credit market due to its own-life (dis)satisfaction or a sense of 
being richer or poorer than others. We also suggest that financial literacy/experience may 
be a factor that stimulates saving and borrowing. Households may be more involved be-
cause they know more about financial strategies themselves or have the experience of par-
ticipating in the financial markets (eg Semenova (2008) suggests that Russian depositors 
use of payroll cards increases their probability of having a long-term deposit in a bank).     
We use recent survey data for a post-Soviet country, including the period of fi-
nancial crisis, 2008-2009. The propensity to save dropped significantly in 2008, from a his-
torically stable 10 percent of total income, and rose again in 2009 to 15 percent, albeit the 
factors triggering the changes were ambiguous. As for the consumer loan market, the pe-
riod of financial instability witnessed a drop in both demand and supply of consumer loans, 
which  may  indicate  that  households  switched  from  formal  to  informal  credit  markets. 
However, after the crisis the banks, being willing to increase lending, may face demand 
problems if the market is greatly influenced by the demand-side factors and these are more 
fundamentally undermined by financial instability. 
The survey allows one to concentrate on self-reported financial strategies. In con-
trast to other studies, we adopt the respondents‟ view of being a saver or a borrower. If 
there is a gap between total income and spending, this need not mean that the household is 
a saver. If the household does not report itself as a saver this may signal that the difference 
cannot be invested because it is reserved for necessary future expenditures. As for bank 
loans, self-reporting is the only way to reveal them, given a lack of access to private bank 
data. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and 
methodology. Sections 3 and 4 present the results of regression analysis, ie the factors that 
influence the propensity to use different financial strategies and the scope of the exposure. 
In Section 5 we offer robustness checks of the results, using data on financial strategies at 
the edge of financial crisis. Section 6 concludes. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 28/ 2011 
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2  Methodology and Data 
 
We use the unique  dataset  originating  from  the 17
th  round of the Russia  Longitudinal 
Monitoring Survey of HSE (RLMS-HSE)
1, which is a series of nationally re presentative 
surveys
2 designed to monitor the effects of Russian reforms on the health and economic 
welfare of households and individuals in Russia. The surveys, which gather data on Ru s-
sian households‟ income, expenditures and welfare, have been conducted 18 times since 
1992. Of these, 15 represent RLMS Phase II, which has been run jointly by the Carolina 
Population Center at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the Demoscope 
team in Russia.  
Our  dataset  is  based  on  household  and  individual  surveys.  In  RLMS-HSE,  a 
household includes all people living with the respondent and having common income and 
expenditures. If the family includes unmarried children under 18, who are not living with 
the respondent because they study in a different city, they are also included in the house-
hold. The data of the 17
th round was collected in September – December 2008, which en-
ables us to observe households‟ decisions during the early phase  of the financial crisis. 
   
The original database covers approximately 5300 households and 13500 individu-
als. After cleaning the household database and merging it with that for individuals (by head 
of household) we end up with 5186 households in our dataset. The number of observations, 
however, may differ for different specifications of our econometric model. 
1)  We study the full range of financial-strategy characteristics available in the 
  dataset, examining the following: 
2)  Whether the household has savings 
3)  Whether the household saved last month (during financial crisis) 
4)  Whether the household has bank loans 
5)  Whether the household borrowed from a bank last month  
6)  (during financial crisis) 
7)  Whether the household has private loans 
8)  Whether the household borrowed from private parties last month  
  (during financial crisis) 
9)  If so, how much (for all of the above) 
10)  Whether the household plans to borrow from a bank in the next 12 months 
                                                 
1 Sources: Russia Longitudinal Monitoring survey, RLMS-HSE, conducted by Higher School of Economics, 
ZAO Demoscope, Carolina Population Center of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and the 
Institute of Sociology RAS. 
2  Sampling  details  may  be  found    at  the  RLMS-HSE  web-site,  http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms-
hse/project/sampling Maria Semenova   Save or borrow -  
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For each of these questions except number 7, we introduce a dummy variable 
equal to one if a household chooses the corresponding strategy or zero otherwise. For ques-
tion 9 we introduce eight variables equal to the corresponding amounts of savings, borrow-
ing and loans (for those observations with corresponding Dummy equal to one). We use 
the “during financial crisis” variables for robustness checks.  The details of these depend-
ent variables (DepVars) will be discussed below.  
As different theories suggest, the following groups of factors may influence the 
household‟s choice of financial strategy and the extent to which it is exposed to the chosen 
strategy: 
1)  Current and future income 
2)  Personal characteristics 
3)  Employment characteristics 
4)  Self-esteem and social characteristics 
5)  Financial literacy and experience 
 
To determine the influence of different groups of factors on household strategy 
choice as well as on the amount of savings and loans for those who chose any strategy, we 
run  the  following  regressions.  The  basic  model  includes  only  standard  inter-temporal 
choice theory variables and control variables:   
  i i i Control Income f DepVar , 0    (1) 
The first extended model takes account of personal characteristics of the head of 
household: 
  i i i i Control Personal Income f DepVar , , 1    (2) 
The second extended model is estimated for those heads of household who are 
employed and includes the length of the working week as well as work satisfaction and 
fear of job loss: 
  i i i i Control Labour Income f DepVar , , 2    (3) 
The third extended model controls for the household‟s self-estimation of financial 
situation, trajectory of development and relative richness and respect of others:  
  i i i i Control Social Income f DepVar , , 3    (4) 
The forth extended model includes the financial literacy variable: 
  i i i i Control FinLit Income f DepVar , , 4    (5) BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 28/ 2011 
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The last model, used in robustness checks, is aimed to control for relationships 
obtained in the previous stages and includes all groups of factors except employment char-
acteristics (in order not to limit the sample to households where the head is employed): 
  i i i i i i Control FinLit Social Personal Income f DepVar , , , , 5    (6) 
We estimate robit models for strategy choice variables and OLS for the amounts 
of savings and loans (with Heckman maximum likelihood correction). We cluster the er-
rors by region.  
Table 1 includes all dependant variables describing the measurement methodology. 
Table 1  Financial strategy variables 
Variable  N  Avg  S.E.  Min.  Max.  Description/survey question 
savings  5186  0.205  0.404  0.000  1.000  How much did your family manage to save, i.e., what 
savings does your family have today - at home or on 
bank deposit, or in floater? If the debt is estimated in 
other currency, please convert it into rubles (if the 
amount exceeds zero, this denotes that savings variable 
equals to 1) 
savings_am*  1063  38.624  65.705  0.100  1000.000 
savings_c  5186  0.141  0.348  0.000  1.000  Did your family in the last 30 days save any money? 
sav-
ings_c_am*  618  8.953  15.877  0.100  250.000 
How many rubles‟ worth did your family save in the 
last 30 days? 
bloan  5186  0.267  0.442  0.000  1.000  Does your family have any credit debts today? 
bloan_am*  1249  135.687  410.349  0.056  10700.000 
How much money does your family owe in credit to-
day? If the debt is estimated in other currency, please 
convert it into rubles. 
bloan_c  5186  0.027  0.163  0.000  1.000 
In the last 30 days, did your family take money on cre-
dit? 
bloan_c_am*  132  61.910  139.103  1.100  1100.000  How much in rubles? 
loanplan  5186  0.035  0.183  0.000  1.000  Are you going to borrow money from a bank in the 
next 12 months? 
ploan  5186  0.072  0.259  0.000  1.000 
Does your family have any money debts to private 
persons today? 
ploan_am*  375  20.924  45.964  0.080  350.000 
How much money does your family owe in credit to-
day? If the debt is estimated in other currency, please 
convert it into rubles 
ploan_c  5186  0.062  0.240  0.000  1.000 
In the last 30 days, did your family borrow money from 
private persons? 
ploan_c_am*  302  13.927  45.087  0.100  480.000  How much in rubles? 
* - in thousands of rubles 
 
Thus, over 20 percent of the respondents claim to have some savings. The average amount 
of savings is 38.5 thousand rubles. As for the crisis period, only 14 percent of the house-
holds saved anything, and the average amount is much lower, 9 thousand rubles. 
Borrowers are even more frequent among respondents – 27 percent of the house-
holds borrow from a bank (another 3 percent plan to borrow next year), 7 percent borrow 
from private parties. The average bank loan is for 136 thousand rubles, and only 21 thou-
sand rubles on average was borrowed privately. The crisis undermined bank borrowing - 
only 3 percent of the households borrowed from a bank in the last 30 days, the average Maria Semenova   Save or borrow -  
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amount being 62 thousand rubles - but did not greatly reduce private borrowing (6 percent 
and 14 thousand respectively). 
The next six tables present the groups of factors which may influence households‟ 
financial strategies. Table 2 presents the income variables. The average household monthly 
income does not exceed 25 thousand rubles. Less than half (40 percent) of the respondents 
said they expect no change in their financial situation during the next year, another 20 per-
cent believed they would earn more.  
We expect that households with higher incomes and worse prospects will save 
more often and more in total. Borrowings will depend on demand or supply conditions. For 
a market without credit rationing, we expect those with higher incomes and better pros-
pects to borrow less frequently and less in total, and vice versa in the case of credit ration-
ing. 
 
Table 2  Income variables 
Variable  N  Avg  S.E.  Min.  Max.  Description/survey question 
income*  4894  24.971  38.702  0  1148  Household income, last 30 days 
fin_nochange12  2920  0.725  0.446  0  1 
Do you think that in the next 12 months you and your family will 
live better than today or worse? 1 - "Nothing will change", 0 - 
"You will live much worse" or "You will live somewhat worse"  
fin_better12  1864  0.567  0.495  0  1 
Do you think that in the next 12 months you and your family will 
live better than today or worse? 1 - "You will live much better" or 
"You will live somewhat better", 0 - "You will live much worse" 
or "You will live somewhat worse"  
* - in thousands of rubles 
 
The personal characteristics of respondents are presented in Table 3. Most are not smarter 
than the others, according to the interviewer, but we can expect them to be more attached 
to the chosen financial strategy in general, though not during the financial crisis. Twenty 
percent of respondents are neutral in terms of life satisfaction and 40 percent are satisfied 
with their lives. We expect the latter to save more and borrow less and less often. This 
would correspond to the precautionary life-style in contrast to „living on credit‟. Many re-
spondents are helpful to outsiders: 30 percent help outside relatives and 6 percent even 
help outsiders who are not relatives. These are expected to borrow mostly privately rather 
than from banks, being involved in mutual help networks.   
 
 
 BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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Table 3  Personal characteristics 
Variable  N  Avg  S.E.  Min.  Max.  Description/survey question 
smart_same*  4715  0.936  0.244  0  1  The respondent was 1 - as bright as the majority of respondents,  
0 - slow-witted 
smart_more*  5163  0.087  0.282  0  1  The respondent was 1 - notably brighter than the majority  
of respondents, 0 - slow-witted 
life_sat  3112  0.388  0.487  0  1  Life satisfaction: 1 - Neutral, 0 - "Rather dissatisfied"  
or "Fully dissatisfied" 
life_sat_more  3952  0.518  0.500  0  1  Life satisfaction: 1 - "Fully satisfied" or "Rather satisfied",  
0 - "Rather dissatisfied" or "Fully dissatisfied" 
help_in  5186  0.325  0.469  0  1  Do you help you relatives, who are not in the household?  
1 - Yes, 0 - otherwise 
help_out  5186  0.061  0.240  0  1  Do you help other people, who are not in the household?  
1 - Yes, 0 - otherwise 
*According to the interviewer 
 
For those who are employed (more than half of the respondents), the attitude to employ-
ment may influence the choice of financial strategy. Nine percent of households include 
members working in another city and commuting to work. We expect them to save more 
and more often. Those who are more or less satisfied with their remuneration (approxi-
mately 30 percent) also seem to be more likely to save and less likely to apply for loans. 
The opposite should be true for those who are worried about job loss (40 percent of re-
spondents). Details on these variables are presented in Table 4. 
   
Table 4  Employment characteristics 
Variable  N  Avg  S.E.  Min.  Max. Description/survey question 
wweek  2964  41.590  11.737  4  120  Working hours, per week 
working_out  5186  0.094  0.293  0  1  For-work mobility of all household members 
ch_work  1776  0.168  0.374  0  1 
Please try to recall whether you have changed your place of work 
or profession since November 2007, or has everything remained 
the same? 1 - "Changed profession, but not place of work" or 
"Changed place of work, but not profession" or "Changed both 
place of work and profession", 0 - "Profession and place of work 
remain the same" 
sat_rem  2060  0.263  0.440  0  1  Satisfaction with remuneration: 1 - Neutral, 0 - "Rather dissatis-
fied" or "Fully dissatisfied"  
sat_rem_more  2439  0.378  0.485  0  1  Satisfaction with remuneration: 1 - "Fully satisfied" or "Rather 
satisfied", 0 - "Rather dissatisfied" or "Fully dissatisfied"  
workfear_neutral 1242  0.271  0.444  0  1  How concerned are you that you might lose your job? 1 -Neutral 0 
- "Not very concerned" or "Not concerned at all" 
workfear  2669  0.661  0.474  0  1 
How concerned are you that you might lose your job? 1 - "Very 
concerned" or "A bit concerned", 0 - "Not very concerned" or "Not 
concerned at all" 
 
Most respondents are quite sure about household-member incomes (see Table 5). Those 
who are not should be rare among borrowers, due to repayment discipline. Among the self-
esteem factors, we emphasize “financial history” (recent changes in household‟s financial 
situation) and “financial satisfaction” (with household‟s current financial situation). More Maria Semenova   Save or borrow -  
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than half of the respondents faced no change and one quarter reported an improvement in 
economic situation. We expect these to save more and more often and to borrow less. The 
majority of respondents (60%) are however still dissatisfied with their finances and so may 
borrow more. 
Few consider themselves rich: 96% of the households considered themselves low 
or middle-income households. The propensity to save should be lower for them, but they 
may borrow less frequently as well, because such self -positioning may be explained by 
some unambiguous external opinion or estimation. On the other hand, if we consider the 
respect accorded to respondents, most (94%) consider themselves to be highly – or at least 
moderately – respected. We expect these households to save more and borrow less, and to 
rely on private parties rather than banks (especially during the crisis). 
 
Table 5  Self-esteem and social characteristics 
Variable  N  Avg  S.E.  Min.  Max. Description/survey question 
sure_inc  5186  0.877  0.329  0  1  Are you sure you know everything about household member incomes? 
fin_nochange 3770  0.741  0.438  0  1  How has the financial situation of your family changed in the last 12 
months? 1 - "Has not changed", 0 - "Worsened"  
fin_better  2344  0.583  0.493  0  1  How has the financial situation of your family changed in the last 12 
months? 1 - "Improved", 0 - "Worsened"  
fin_sat  4088  0.235  0.424  0  1  How satisfied are you with your economic conditions at the present 
time? 1 - Neutral, 0 - Dissatisfied 
fin_sat_more  4190  0.253  0.435  0  1  How satisfied are you with your economic conditions at the present 
time? 1 - Satisfied, 0 - Dissatisfied 
s_rich2  4922  0.598  0.490  0  1 
Imagine a nine-step ladder where on the bottom, the first step, stand 
the poorest people, and on the highest step, the ninth, stand the rich, 
On which step of the nine steps are you personally standing today? 1 - 
4-6 step, 0 - 1-3 step 
s_rich3  2183  0.093  0.290  0  1 
Imagine a nine-step ladder where on the bottom, the first step, stand 
the poorest people, and on the highest step, the ninth, stand the rich, 
On which step of the nine steps are you personally standing today? 1 - 
7-9 step, 0 - 1-3 step 
s_resp2  2787  0.890  0.313  0  1 
Imagine a nine-step ladder where on the lowest step stand people who 
are absolutely not respected, and on the highest step stand those who 
are very respected, On which of the nine steps are you personally 
standing today?  1 - 4-6 step, 0 - 1-3 step 
s_resp3  2461  0.876  0.330  0  1 
Imagine a nine-step ladder where on the lowest step stand people who 
are absolutely not respected, and on the highest step stand those who 
are very respected, On which of the nine steps are you personally 
standing today?  1 - 7-9-6 step, 0 - 1-3 step 
 
The institutional factors are presented in Table 6. We concentrate on the financial literacy 
and financial experience of the head of the household, as these may stimulate the house-
hold to save and/or to borrow. We proxy financial literacy by higher education (includes 
one quarter of respondents), employment in finance, education or science (10 percent) and 
internet use (22 percent). Experience is proxied by the use of bank cards (30 percent have BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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cards, 22 percent use them only for withdrawing cash) and foreign currency and stock 
market participation (however, less than one percent of respondents have such experience). 
 
Table 6  Financial literacy and experience 
Variable  N  Avg  S.E.  Min.  Max. Description/survey question 
inet  5186  0.217  0.412  0  1  Internet usage, last 30 days 
gen_inv  5186  0.006  0.078  0  1 
Did your family spend money in the last 30 days, for stocks, bonds, 
or other investment papers? For buying currency with the aim of 
saving? In the last 30 days, did your family sell shares or other secur-
ities? 1 - Yes (at least one activity), 0 - None of these 
card_use_cash  4778  0.249  0.433  0  1  How do you use your bank card? 1- Only in order to draw out money 
from account, 0 - No card 
card_use_pay  3616  0.008  0.089  0  1  How do you use your bank card? 1 - Only in order to pay for goods 
and services, 0 - No card 
card_use_both  3966  0.096  0.294  0  1  How do you use your bank card? 1 -In order to draw out money from 
account and to pay for goods and services, 0 - No card 
edu  5186  0.241  0.428  0  1  Education: 1 - Higher education, 0 - Otherwise 
finprof  5186  0.104  0.305  0  1  1 - if the respondent is occupied in Finance, Science or Education, 0 
- otherwise 
 
Finally Table 7 includes a set of control variables, such as demographic factors, national-
ity, household size and composition, and living conditions. Most respondents are female 
and Russian, and the average age is approximately 49. The majority are in married (offi-
cially or not) couples with two children living in a one-bedroom apartment in a city or 
town. 
We expect that households with more members and children, smaller apartments 
and living in an urban area to save more and more often. The hypotheses related to borrow-
ing from a bank are again different, depending the nature of the market.  
 
Table 7  Control variables 
Variable  N  Avg  S.E.  Min.  Max.  Description/survey question 
sex  5186  0.888  0.315  0  1  Sex. 0 – male, 1 - female  
age  5184  49.158  16.899  17  95  Age 
rus  5186  0.852  0.356  0  1  Nationality. 1- Russian, 0 - otherwise 
married  5176  0.605  0.489  0  1  Marital status: 1 - married or living with a partner, 0 – single, 
divorced, married, but living separately  
hh_size  5186  2.742  1.419  1  13  Number of household members 
child  4498  1.736  0.861  1  12  Number of children 
h_rooms  5171  2.269  0.991  1  10  Number of rooms in apartment 
rural  5186  0.304  0.460  0  1  A household lives in 1 – countryside, 0 - city or town 
* - in thousands of rubles 
 Maria Semenova   Save or borrow -  
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3  Becoming a saver or a borrower: results 
 
The results for probability of positive savings regressions are presented in Table 8
3. As the 
inter-temporal theory suggests, higher current income increases the probability of sa ving. 
However, the coefficient is very low, so that the economic significance is likely to be m i-
nor. Moreover, expectations about future incomes have  a U-shaped effect. Compared to 
respondents who expect a deterioration in family finances during the next year, households 
expecting no change save less, as predicted by the theory. At the same time, respondents 
who expect an increase in wealth save more. T hus the influence of future income is not 
fully in accord with the predictions of inter-temporal choice theory.    
Respondents‟ personal characteristics proved to be important for the propensity to 
save. Controlling for income variables and other basics (age, nationality, marital status, 
household size, number of children), the respondents who seem to be the smartest and who 
are satisfied with their lives and are used to helping other people (even non-household-
members) are more likely to save. 
Working heads of household are more likely to save if they enjoy a shorter work 
week or are satisfied with their remuneration. Surprisingly, the fear of being fired does not 
stimulate saving. 
The personal perception of the household‟s financial situation is significant for the 
propensity to save, unlike the perception of financial situation compared to other house-
holds. Those who enjoy stable or improving financial conditions as well as those who are 
satisfied with them are more likely to save. The explanation for this could be that they ac-
cumulate a precautionary buffer in the current situation of financial well-being. On the 
other hand, feeling richer than others does not stimulate saving. 
Finally, financial literacy (in terms of experience and education) promotes saving. 
The propensity to save is higher if the head of household has a higher education or the 
household has some experience in dealing with financial markets, as is the case for posses-
sion of bank cards and their use in acquiring cash (adding a payment function, however, 
reduces the propensity to save). But the use of internet or being in a financial profession 
has no effect on savings.       
                                                 
3 Only statistically significant control variables are reported. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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As for the control variables, households with an older head who is married (or liv-
ing with a partner), such that at least one partner considers him/herself to be Russian, are 
more likely to save. The same is true for the smaller ones and those with less children.  
  
Table 8  Results: Savings (probability, marginal effects)  
Variable  I  Variable  II  Variable  III  Variable  IV  Variable  V 
income  0.000  income  0.000  income  0.000  income  0.000  income  0.000 
   (0.000)**     (0.000)**     (0.000)**     (0.000)**     (0.000)** 
fin_nochange12  -0.021  fin_nochange12  -0.033  fin_nochange12  -0.058  fin_nochange12  -0.065  fin_nochange12  -0.015 
   (0.016)     (0.016)**     (0.025)**     (0.018)***     (0.016) 
fin_better12  0.071  fin_better12  0.033  fin_better12  0.024  fin_better12  -0.018  fin_better12  0.079 
   (0.032)**     (0.028)     (0.039)     (0.031)     (0.031)** 
    smart_same  0.031  wweek  -0.002  sure_inc  -0.008  inet  0.028 
      (0.026)    (0.001)***    (0.030)    (0.020) 
    smart_more  0.167  working_out  0.049  fin_nochange  0.057  gen_inv  0.269 
      (0.055)***    (0.034)    (0.024)**    (0.101)*** 
    life_sat  0.096  ch_work  -0.028  fin_better  0.115  card_use_cash  0.043 
      (0.022)***    (0.028)    (0.025)***    (0.022)* 
    life_sat_more  0.088  sat_rem  0.064  fin_sat  0.051  card_use_pay  -0.018 
      (0.025)***    (0.028)**    (0.027)*    (0.094) 
    help_in  0.099  sat_rem_more  0.052  fin_sat_more  0.058  card_use_both  -0.054 
      (0.017)***    (0.032)    (0.027)**    (0.025)** 
    help_out  0.126  workfear_neutral  -0.002  s_rich2  0.036  edu  0.059 
      (0.030)***    (0.028)    (0.023)    (0.018)*** 
        workfear  -0.032  s_rich3  0.051  finprof  0.017 
          (0.024)    (0.053)    (0.026) 
            s_resp2  -0.016     
              (0.038)     
            s_resp3  0.024     
              (0.036)     
age  0.004  age  0.004  age  0.005  age  0.004  age  0.005 
   (0.001)***     (0.001)***     (0.001)***     (0.001)***     (0.001)*** 
rus  0.073  rus  0.071  rus  0.089  rus  0.074  rus  0.070 
   (0.028)***     (0.028)**     (0.031)***     (0.029)**     (0.027)** 
married  0.075  married  0.046  married  0.057  married  0.067  married  0.077 
   (0.019)***     (0.019)**     (0.023)**     (0.019)***     (0.019)*** 
hh_size  -0.022  hh_size  -0.011  hh_size  -0.031  hh_size  -0.022  hh_size  -0.024 
   (0.006)***     (0.006)*     (0.009)***     (0.007)***     (0.007)*** 
child  -0.018  child  -0.027  child  -0.001  child  -0.014  child  -0.016 
   (0.008)**     (0.009)***     (0.014)     (0.009)     (0.008)** 
N  3,777.000     3,746.000     1,931.000     3,587.000     3,777.000 
LR chi^2  138.728***     419.876***     169.491***    269.408***     234.946*** 
Preudo R^2  0.038     0.070     0.049     0.055     0.048 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Thus our results suggest that - controlling for a large number of factors - smartness, readi-
ness to help others, satisfaction with life and finances,
4 and recent financial improvement 
increase the likelihood of saving much more than do the factors suggested by the theory, ie 
higher income and precautionary concerns. The former factors, which have not been co n-
sidered in previous studies, proved to have significant effects; hence the saving decision 
may be based on feelings and self-estimation rather than economic rationality and forward-
                                                 
4 One may think that these two variables are highly correlated as life satisfaction may be explained by healthy 
financial situation. Surprisingly that‟s not true for Russian households: 42 percent of those, who are satisfied 
with their lives, are satisfied with their financial situation, but 37 percent are dissatisfied with the rest 21 per-
cent being neutral. Maria Semenova   Save or borrow -  
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looking expectations. Although the regression dealing with fina ncial literacy provides a 
slightly weaker explanation of the data, it seems to show the significance of the factor with 
the greatest influence - financial literacy due to financial experience and education. This 
corresponds with the results for US data by Han and Sherraden (2009), who however use 
different measures of financial literacy.     
In analyzing borrowers‟ behavior we concentrate on bank loans. Table 9 presents 
the results. 
We start with the basic income variables. Households expecting stable or higher 
incomes  in  future  are  more  likely  to  be  borrowers.  This  corresponds  well  with  inter-
temporal choice theory. At the same time current income has a positive influence on this 
probability (albeit very small and unstable). This could mean that supply-side factors out-
weigh demand-side factors: households with lower incomes may be rationed even if they 
have a certain demand for bank loans, as current income is one of the most frequently ap-
plied criteria for banks‟ lending decisions. 
Personal characteristics are not significant,  with one exception: those ready to 
help other people outside the household are more likely to borrow. Nor are employment 
characteristics important. The only factor that influences the probability of becoming a 
bank client is the length of the work week: the more the working hours, the higher the 
probability. This can also add to the supply-side story: those who work more may be con-
sidered more reliable borrowers.  
Respondents who are satisfied with their household‟s financial situation are less 
likely to have a bank loan. Thus a bank loan seems to be a source of dissatisfaction to the 
borrower. Quite naturally those who are not quite sure about household income are less 
likely to become borrowers.    
Financial literacy, proxied by occupation and experience, proved to be significant: 
those who actively use bank cards and have finance-related jobs are more likely to be bank 
clients. 
As for controls, the households with a female, younger or married head or that in-
clude more children or are larger are all more likely to borrow from the bank. This profile 
is the opposite of a saving household, and accords better with the demand-side group of 
factors. 
Thus our results suggest that behind the fact of a household being a bank borrower 
is a mixture of supply-side (current and future income) and demand-side factors (larger BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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households with more children). The largest effect is, however, provided by financial liter-
acy (as in case of savings).  
 
Table 9  Results: Bank loans (probability, marginal effects)  
Variable  I  Variable  II  Variable  III  Variable  IV  Variable  V 
income  0.000  income  0.000  income  0.000  income  0.000  income  0.000 
   (0.000)     (0.000)     (0.000)*     (0.000)     (0.000) 
fin_nochange12  0.047  fin_nochange12  0.045  fin_nochange12  0.069  fin_nochange12  0.050  fin_nochange12  0.054 
   (0.021)**     (0.020)**     (0.031)**     (0.025)**     (0.022)** 
fin_better12  0.067  fin_better12  0.061  fin_better12  0.104  fin_better12  0.077  fin_better12  0.072 
   (0.025)***     (0.025)**     (0.036)***     (0.028)***     (0.026)*** 
      smart_same  0.040  wweek   0.003  sure_inc  -0.077  inet  0.003 
         (0.035)     (0.001)***     (0.037)**     (0.021) 
      smart_more  0.009  working_out  0.010  fin_nochange  0.026  gen_inv  -0.032 
         (0.053)     (0.057)     (0.022)     (0.092) 
      life_sat  0.019  ch_work   0.015  fin_better  0.043  card_use_cash  0.097 
         (0.023)     (0.035)     (0.022)*     (0.023)*** 
      life_sat_more  0.004  sat_rem   -0.030  fin_sat  -0.068  card_use_pay  0.423 
         (0.019)     (0.038)     (0.019)***     (0.128)*** 
      help_in  0.047  sat_rem_more   -0.029  fin_sat_more  -0.084  card_use_both  0.162 
         (0.019)**     (0.031)     (0.020)***     (0.044)*** 
      help_out  0.095  workfear_neutral   -0.018  s_rich2  0.032  edu  -0.008 
        (0.040)**     (0.042)     (0.021)     (0.016) 
          workfear   0.004  s_rich3  0.040  finprof  0.060 
             (0.034)     (0.044)     (0.028)** 
                s_resp2  -0.017       
                   (0.035)       
                s_resp3  0.011       
                     (0.034)       
sex  0.085  sex  0.085  sex  0.099  sex  0.071  sex  0.089 
   (0.020)***     (0.020)***     (0.040)**     (0.021)***     (0.020)*** 
age  -0.008  age  -0.008  age  -0.008  age  -0.007  age  -0.007 
   (0.001)***     (0.001)***     (0.001)***     (0.001)***     (0.001)*** 
married  0.056  married  0.045  married  0.079  married  0.052  married  0.055 
   (0.019)***     (0.018)**     (0.031)**     (0.020)***     (0.019)*** 
hh_size  0.030  hh_size  0.034  hh_size  0.016  hh_size  0.025  hh_size  0.032 
   (0.009)***     (0.009)***     (0.014)     (0.009)***     (0.009)*** 
child  0.025  child  0.021  child  0.045  child  0.030  child  0.022 
   (0.010)**     (0.010)**     (0.016)***     (0.010)***     (0.009)** 
N  3,777.000     3,746.000     1,931.000     3,587.000     3,777.000 
LR chi^2  1,619.170***   3,332.863***    266.841***   2,078.436***    2,405.767*** 
Preudo R^2  0.125     0.131     0.055     0.130     0.140 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Who are more likely to say they are going to borrow from a bank during  the next 12 
month, given that a crisis is in the offing (see Table 10)? These are younger households 
with more children and a readiness to help people outside the household. What undermines 
the incentives to borrow are satisfaction with remuneration from employment and fear of 
being fired. Satisfaction with the household‟s current financial situation, in contrast, makes 
future borrowings more probable. The same effect obtains for the use of bank cards for 
cash withdrawals or for both withdrawals and payments. The effects of the significant vari-
ables, however, do not differ greatly from each other and are not very strong.      
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Table 10  Results: Next year bank loans (probability, marginal effects) 
Variable  I  Variable  II  Variable  III  Variable  IV  Variable  V 
income  0.000  income  0.000  income  0.000  income  0.000  income  0.000 
   (0.000)*     (0.000)     (0.000)*     (0.000)     (0.000) 
fin_nochange12  -0.000  fin_nochange12  0.000  fin_nochange12  0.001  fin_nochange12  0.001  fin_nochange12  0.001 
   (0.007)     (0.007)     (0.015)     (0.006)     (0.006) 
fin_better12  0.009  fin_better12  0.006  fin_better12  0.018  fin_better12  0.003  fin_better12  0.009 
   (0.009)     (0.009)     (0.019)     (0.008)     (0.008) 
      smart_same  0.006  wweek   0.001  sure_inc  -0.014  inet  0.003 
         (0.013)     (0.000)*     (0.010)     (0.008) 
      smart_more  0.015  working_out  0.015  fin_nochange  0.002  gen_inv  0.076 
         (0.025)     (0.019)     (0.008)     (0.049) 
      life_sat  -0.006  ch_work   0.010  fin_better  0.020  card_use_cash  0.016 
         (0.005)     (0.016)     (0.011)*     (0.007)** 
      life_sat_more  0.000  sat_rem   -0.026  fin_sat  -0.001  card_use_pay  0.102 
         (0.006)     (0.009)***     (0.007)     (0.071) 
      help_in  0.014  sat_rem_more   -0.009  fin_sat_more  -0.006  card_use_both  0.027 
         (0.007)**     (0.011)     (0.005)     (0.012)** 
      help_out  0.019  workfear_neutral   -0.014  s_rich2  0.004  edu  0.007 
        (0.018)     (0.014)     (0.008)     (0.006) 
          workfear   -0.028  s_rich3  -0.002  finprof  0.005 
             (0.011)**     (0.010)     (0.009) 
                s_resp2  -0.013       
                   (0.013)       
                s_resp3  -0.005       
                   (0.012)       
age  -0.001     -0.001     -0.001     -0.001     -0.001 
   (0.000)***   (0.000)***    (0.000)***   (0.000)***     (0.000)*** 
child  0.007    0.007     0.010    0.008     0.007 
   (0.003)**     (0.003)**     (0.008)     (0.003)***     (0.003)** 
N  3,777.000     3,746.000     1,931.000     3,587.000     3,777.000 
LR chi^2  151.703***   150.935***    140.117***   175.466***    343.023*** 
Preudo R^2  0.068     0.080     0.046     0.081     0.092 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
 
4  How much to save or to borrow: results 
 
We now consider those who are savers or bank borrowers and analyze the factors that in-
fluence the amounts saved or borrowed. This allows us to analyze exposure to chosen fi-
nancial strategies. We estimate the regressions via Heckman maximum likelihood and thus 
obtain coefficients that are conditional on a household choosing a given financial strategy.  
We start with savings (see Table 11). Higher income naturally increases total sav-
ings, adding approximately 0.2 ruble to total savings per ruble of household income. This 
is comparable to the macro data showing that 14 percent of total income went into savings 
in 2009 (see Figure 1)
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Figure 1  Household saving, % of total income 
 
Personal characteristics are significant: those satisfied with their lives, and those helping 
relatives  outside  the  household  save  8-12.5  and  10  thousand  rubles  more  respectively 
(however, these results are not stable). Working conditions and fear of job loss have no ef-
fect at all. However, those satisfied with their remuneration, save 12-14 thousand rubles 
more. Those who are neutral about or satisfied with their households‟ financial situation 
save 14.5 and 25 thousand rubles respectively.    
Financial literacy and experience also boost savings: those with experience in the 
financial markets save 44 thousand rubles more, and the use of bank cards for cash with-
drawals adds another 9.5-11 thousand. Respondents with higher education save an addi-
tional 20 thousand rubles, but those working in finance, science or education save 14 thou-
sand rubles less. 
Finally, more is saved by households with a male head (this adds approximately 
16-19 thousand rubles to total savings), older (each year adds 1126 rubles, but not in all 
specifications), owning larger apartments (each room means an additional 8200-9100 ru-
bles in savings), having less children (each additional child means 4-7 thousand less of 
savings) and living in an urban area (these households save 13-20 thousand rubles more). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
5 Sourse: Russian Federation Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat). Maria Semenova   Save or borrow -  
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Table 11  Results: Savings (amount)  
Variable  I  Variable  II  Variable  III  Variable  IV  Variable  V 
income  0.221  income  0.215  income  0.129  income  0.194  income  0.187 
   (0.124)*     (0.116)*     (0.092)     (0.111)*     (0.123) 
fin_nochange12  734.798  fin_nochange12  -547.348  fin_nochange12  2,473.641  fin_nochange12  -5,495.845  fin_nochange12  4,423.446 
   (3,965.883)     (4,286.594)     (5,144.531)     (4,903.290)     (4,937.340) 
fin_better12  -434.209  fin_better12  -2,981.270  fin_better12  -6,461.444  fin_better12  -14,322.006  fin_better12  3,549.234 
   (5,080.642)     (5,255.210)     (5,872.648)     (5,448.384)***     (6,058.902) 
      smart_same  10,856.954  wweek   -192.346  sure_inc  5,900.351  inet  3,989.452 
         (7,302.254)     (132.721)     (5,774.448)     (7,591.615) 
      smart_more  10,477.382  working_out  11,144.266  fin_nochange  -5,021.417  gen_inv  41,298.631 
         (8,390.087)     (10,185.108)     (7,351.470)     (25,748.483) 
      life_sat  8,777.912  ch_work   -6,352.068  fin_better  580.937  card_use_cash  11,726.088 
         (4,441.936)**     (6,485.151)     (9,072.560)     (4,198.473)*** 
      life_sat_more  12,457.110  sat_rem   14,502.914  fin_sat  14,444.155  card_use_pay  -25,851.893 
         (3,938.396)***     (6,740.332)**     (7,904.701)*     (15,216.293)* 
      help_in  9,727.731  sat_rem_more   12,334.300  fin_sat_more  25,136.741  card_use_both  6,590.737 
         (4,737.499)**     (5,155.260)**     (7,596.704)***     (15,188.829) 
      help_out  4,009.484  workfear_neutral   -3,058.471  s_rich2  6,747.703  edu  23,006.061 
        (5,641.544)     (6,810.855)     (4,727.529)     (7,741.752)*** 
          workfear   5,343.963  s_rich3  11,474.617  finprof  -13,567.557 
             (8,989.467)     (11,462.445)     (4,576.685)*** 
                s_resp2  -3,736.726       
                   (7,751.597)       
                s_resp3  549.806       
                     (8,525.247)       
sex  -19,400.464    -19,630.807     -32,118.577    -19,266.938     -16,104.987 
   (10,480.912)*   (9,843.423)**    (24,927.369)    (11,182.321)*     (9,514.813)* 
age  180.937    200.636     1,125.821    161.930     306.265 
   (200.771)    (221.469)     (500.263)**    (196.762)     (191.314) 
child  -2,840.914    -4,723.881     -7,908.356    -2,906.859     -1,374.594 
   (1,967.391)     (2,742.924)*     (3,352.834)**   (2,059.982)     (1,689.833) 
h_rooms  9,108.221    8,446.892     6,568.018    8,702.327     8,828.350 
   (4,146.965)**    (3,839.116)**     (7,009.978)    (3,990.703)**     (4,151.815)** 
rural  -20,331.983    -18,885.142     -24,089.117    -16,859.977     -12,851.913 
   (9,359.967)**    (8,859.929)**     (11,298.367)**   (8,289.316)**     (6,890.832)* 
const  46,777.884     24,910.939     31,139.895     37,337.004     22,577.479 
   (20,254.136)**    (18,909.830)     (24,320.345)     (21,070.475)*    (17,308.738) 
AthRho   -0.170    -0.158     -0.178    -0.162     -0.158 
   (0.068)**    (0.064)**     (0.088)**    (0.061)***     (0.062)** 
N  3,777.000    3,767.000     3,355.000    3,740.000     3,777.000 
Chi^2  59.383***     182.787***     75.066***     251.839***     210.529*** 
 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Our results show that most of the factors that increase the probability of saving also in-
crease the exposure to this financial strategy. The exceptions are certain financial literacy 
variables: being involved in financial activities increases the probability of saving but not 
the amount saved given that the household becomes a saver, in contrast to satisfaction with 
life and finances or readiness to help people outside the household.  
Now we turn to borrowing. Current and future incomes prove to be among the 
factors with the greatest influence: each additional ruble of current income adds 0.7-1 ruble 
to total bank borrowing. The effect of the future-income proxy is also quite pronounced: 
those expecting stable incomes save an extra 30-55 thousand rubles compared to those ex-
pecting a decrease in income.  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Satisfaction with life, wage and family finances as a whole prove to be important 
for  borrowing.  Those  who  are  satisfied  with  their  lives  borrow  30-75  thousand  rubles 
more, and those who are satisfied with their remuneration save 65 thousand rubles more. 
At the same time, those who changed jobs borrow less (and this is in line with the rationing 
theory). 
Quite  naturally  the  respondents  who  enjoy  an  improving  household  financial 
situation borrow less (by 70-75 thousand rubles). This is clearly a demand-side factor, 
though. 
Financial literacy seems not to carry much weight. Our results suggest that educa-
tion is the only such factor that is significant: those with higher education borrow 50 thou-
sand rubles more.   
Finally households living in rural areas, with non-married or Russian heads have 
bank loans of 45-75, 36-60 or 100 thousand rubles less respectively (see Table 12). What 
contradicts the inter-temporal theory but accords with credit rationing theory is that total 
bank borrowing is higher for households with higher incomes and at least not bad expecta-
tions about future income. Total borrowing amounts to approximately one month‟s house-
hold income. 
Thus, in contrast to savings, the amount of the exposure to this strategy depends 
on a different set of factors than those that determine the choice of strategy. We show the 
importance of income factors that strongly influence the amount of borrowing (as well as 
the probability of borrowing, as shown above), but what determines the amount of borrow-
ing is a set of life and finance satisfaction variables, significant for savings but not for the 
choice of borrowing strategy. This means that subjective self-estimation is important for 
both groups of households, savers and borrowers, although it has different effects for the 
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Table 12  Results: Bank loans (amount)  
Variable  I  Variable  II  Variable  III  Variable  IV  Variable  V 
income  1.011  income  0.993  income  0.746  income  0.770  income  0.922 
   (0.444)**     (0.432)**     (0.225)***     (0.248)***     (0.400)** 
fin_nochange12  46,904.243  fin_nochange12  39,689.575  fin_nochange12  2,985.971  fin_nochange12  28,435.438  fin_nochange12  54,393.513 
   (25,155.419)*     (22,393.057)*     (20,605.238)     (22,562.815)     (26,010.693)** 
fin_better12  6,958.825  fin_better12  -12,052.432  fin_better12  -2,822.769  fin_better12  11,453.488  fin_better12  15,591.580 
   (16,411.148)     (20,971.047)     (23,294.855)     (20,334.651)     (16,418.744) 
      smart_same  41,481.339  wweek   253.982  sure_inc  -1,440.129  inet  -10,286.540 
        (39,451.223)     (646.185)     (27,270.836)     (20,671.273) 
     smart_more  18,728.166  working_out  -29,240.965  fin_nochange  -50,172.604  gen_inv  -36,431.272 
        (35,111.079)     (20,490.967)     (39,465.975)     (86,281.854) 
     life_sat  32,652.522  ch_work   -26,993.961  fin_better  -69,354.275  card_use_cash  -3,695.622 
        (16,786.941)*     (14,963.852)*     (40,905.795)*     (29,058.517) 
     life_sat_more  76,391.412  sat_rem   10,455.054  fin_sat  16,330.225  card_use_pay  -34,348.924 
        (33,498.384)**     (18,814.269)     (15,373.980)     (35,178.375) 
     help_in  -29,321.466  sat_rem_more   64,167.718  fin_sat_more  51,346.967  card_use_both  5,934.587 
        (31,486.493)     (27,627.837)**     (27,822.439)*     (31,097.862) 
     help_out  620.623  workfear_neutral   15,823.131  s_rich2  19,424.167  edu  103,100.500 
        (38,455.221)     (23,869.812)     (12,445.939)     (66,133.909) 
           workfear   -1,043.497  s_rich3  31,296.591  finprof  -45,069.833 
             (20,937.157)     (58,121.702)     (30,214.593) 
               s_resp2  -22,675.073      
                  (23,645.919)      
               s_resp3  -29,047.394      
                     (26,699.329)       
married  57,961.756  married  59,504.069  married  31,755.201  married  34,471.941  married  58,521.016 
   (25,737.480)**     (29,545.527)**     (18,291.700)*     (14,281.567)**     (25,535.103)** 
hh_size  -4,735.656  hh_size  -5,964.284  hh_size  -16,760.103  hh_size  -7,358.830  hh_size  423.140 
   (6,646.650)     (6,428.669)     (5,956.532)***     (6,283.991)     (7,971.849) 
child  -14,035.594  child  -11,871.521  child  3,594.224  child  -8,163.776  child  -11,552.849 
   (8,135.162)*     (7,665.908)     (7,659.214)     (5,088.302)     (7,842.461) 
h_rooms  19,762.199  h_rooms  17,908.077  h_rooms  23,085.275  h_rooms  20,278.853  h_rooms  13,369.638 
   (8,372.142)**     (8,196.321)**     (11,643.276)**     (8,300.747)**     (7,691.421)* 
rural  -76,702.556  rural  -73,340.109  rural  -53,936.146  rural  -57,336.211  rural  -65,250.224 
   (25,735.403)***     (24,384.119)***     (18,860.233)***     (17,739.808)***     (25,146.822)*** 
const  105,168.900     23,538.401     91,129.807     176,296.238     68,801.699 
   (51,488.476)**    (79,933.270)     (75,756.575)     (74,971.004)**    (56,411.079) 
AthRho   -0.022     -0.022     -0.041     -0.053     -0.021 
   (0.019)     (0.018)    (0.089)     (0.032)*    (0.019) 
N  4,495.000     4,487.000    4,246.000     4,462.000    4,495.000 
Chi^2  53.358***     67.504***     108.827***     99.343***     67.234*** 




5  Robustness checks:  
  financial strategies at the edge of financial crisis 
 
We also conducted several robustness checks on our results. First, we estimated all the 
probit regressions
6 for the period just before the financial crisis started, using the “last-30-
days” dependant variables. The results are reported in the Appendix. The significant fac-
tors for savings during the financial crisis do not differ much from those for the probability 
of saving (see Table A1). Age, nationality and marital status have the same influence, but 
                                                 
6 We did not reestimate the OLS regressions, as the coefficients would be different due to the shorter period 
of financial strategy and would not be comparable to coefficients for stock variables. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 28/ 2011 
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the effects are more modest. But the number-of- children effect is twice as large. The size 
of the household and the place-of-residence type do not influence the propensity to save 
more.  The  inferences  from  inter-temporal  theory  are  again  partly  substantiated:  richer 
households save more while future income has a mixed effect. As for personal characteris-
tics, whether the respondent is smart or helps outsiders has no bearing on crisis-period sav-
ing, in contrast to good times. Employment characteristics seem to be more significant in 
the period of financial turmoil. In addition to the above, savings are more probable if the 
household‟s members commute to another city to work. Those who changed their em-
ployment are, at least to some extent, less likely to save. It‟s worth noting that even when 
the financial crisis unfolded the respondents were not setting aside precautionary savings 
for job loss. The perception of the financial situation – personal and social – plays the same 
role for savings. The only sign that relative richness is important is that households that 
jumped from “poor-rich” to the medium ranking saved with higher probability. Once the 
crisis  began, financial literacy lost its  importance for savings.  The only factor that re-
mained significant was the use of bank cards: active users were still less likely to save.    
Borrowing during financial crisis depends on a mixture of demand-side and sup-
ply-side factors as well (see Table A2). Borrowers are more likely to be younger respon-
dents owning smaller apartments, but total income influences this probability positively 
(while expectations about future income are not significant). Those who seem to be smarter 
are less likely to borrow during the crisis, as are those who are satisfied with their wages 
and their families‟ financial situation, or at least claim to be aware of the latter. Consider-
ing financial literacy, the situation is very similar to saving in a crisis: internet users as well 
as bank card owners that use cards only for cash withdrawals are more likely to borrow.  
Another  robustness  check  (not  reported  here)  implied  that  regional  clustering 
could be excluded from all the estimations. The results proved to be less stable across 
specifications and occasionally less significant. However the main body of the results is 
statistically significant at the chosen significance level.     
Finally we checked for the robustness of results by running the regressions with 
all the independent variables included (except only for employment characteristics, in or-
der not to restrict the sample to employed respondents). Most of the results remain un-
changed and thus seem to be quite robust (see Table A3 in the Appendix).  
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6  Conclusion 
 
In this paper we attempted to determine whether there is a saving-borrowing dichotomy in 
the financial strategies of Russian households and to discover what stands behind house-
holds‟ choices to save and to borrow in formal and informal markets. We hypothesize 
these factors to include more than current and expected incomes. As numerous empirical 
studies have shown, personal, social and institutional characteristics may have even more 
influence on households‟ choices. For households that chose one of the strategies analyzed, 
we examine the determinants of the exposure, namely, the amount of funds saved, lent or 
borrowed. Our unique dataset allows us to find out whether the dependencies obtained are 
stable and extend over the financial crisis period, when the households had to change fi-
nancial strategies in the changing circumstances. 
Our  results  suggest  that  the  saver-borrower  dichotomy  suggested  by  inter-
temporal consumption theory is well founded only for savings and private borrowing, and 
for savings and future bank loans. Bank borrowers are frequently savers at the same time. 
Notably, for those who both save and borrow, the amounts of savings and borrowing are 
positively correlated. The dichotomy between savings and bank loans, however, appears at 
the onset of the financial crisis in Russia.  
We show that current income increases the propensities to save and to borrow, but 
future income has no unambiguous effect, which again contradicts the inter-temporal the-
ory. Individual characteristics proved to be important: smart respondents, satisfied with 
their lives and used to helping other people, are more likely to save. The same is true for 
those who are satisfied with their wages. Surprisingly, the fear of job loss does not make 
people save more (although it does prevent borrowing from banks). Those who enjoy sta-
ble or improving financial conditions and/or are satisfied with them, are more likely to 
save and less likely to borrow.  
Those who borrow from banks are exposed mostly to credit rationing, implying 
the importance and dominance of demand-side factors (such as current and future incomes, 
stable employment, larger apartment etc).  
Financial literacy is significant for both saving and bank borrowing. Financial 
education and experience increase the propensity to save (except for bank card use, which 
curbs saving) and to borrow from a bank.  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 28/ 2011 
 
 
  29 
The financial crisis did not greatly change the set of significant factors. The only 
exception is financial literacy, which became much less important for the choice of finan-
cial strategy. 
Several policy implications may be drawn from our results. As the post-crisis re-
covery is going quite smoothly now in Russia, we can expect the revival of both savings 
and bank borrowing. The former will be stimulated by higher incomes as well as better ex-
pectations, life satisfaction, self-confidence, openness and even being in a good mood. But 
economic or political instability, heighted public debate about Russia‟s future, or bad pros-
pects may deter saving even if incomes keep rising. The latter is mainly based on economic 
factors related to credit rationing and financial literacy. The second factor is important for 
savings as well, so that the programs aimed at increasing people‟s financial literacy – now 
gaining in popularity across Russia – seem to push in the right direction. But can we attract 
additional bank borrowers from an informal market? The answer our results suggest is “not 
easily”. These households base their decisions mostly on psychological and social factors, 
which are naturally difficult to influence.     
We suggest at least two directions for further research. The first involves cross-
country comparisons of household financial strategies. Using similar household surveys 
conducted in other countries, it might be possible to identify the factors that are common 
for most households and typical for Russia. This may help us to find the “mysterious Rus-
sian soul” in households‟ financial decisions based on psychological factors and using em-
pirical data. Another possible extension of this study would be a detailed analysis of mixed 
strategies, namely those of households that choose more than one strategy simultaneously.  
The savings of bank borrowers may be explained by either the precautionary motive or by 
strict conditions for loan contracts. A mixture of bank and private loans may exist because 
of credit rationing or an unwillingness to become an “official” borrower (which may ex-
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 Appendix 
 
Table A1  Results: Crisis savings (probability, marginal effects) 
Variable  I  Variable  II  Variable  III  Variable  IV  Variable  V 
income  0.000  income  0.000  income  0.000  income  0.000  income  0.000 
   (0.000)**     (0.000)**     (0.000)*     (0.000)*     (0.000)* 
fin_nochange12  -0.007  fin_nochange12  -0.015  fin_nochange12  -0.022  fin_nochange12  -0.047  fin_nochange12  -0.002 
   (0.019)     (0.018)     (0.024)     (0.018)**     (0.019) 
fin_better12  0.103  fin_better12  0.069  fin_better12  0.049  fin_better12  0.004  fin_better12  0.108 
   (0.025)***     (0.023)***     (0.031)     (0.021)     (0.025)*** 
      smart_same  0.013  wweek   -0.000  sure_inc  -0.012  inet  0.030 
  
 
   (0.020)     (0.001)     (0.021)     (0.019) 
  
 
smart_more  0.058  working_out  0.109  fin_nochange  0.058  gen_inv  0.170 
  
 
   (0.038)     (0.041)***     (0.015)***     (0.085)** 
  
 
life_sat  0.041  ch_work   -0.055  fin_better  0.117  card_use_cash  0.018 
  
 
   (0.019)**     (0.018)***     (0.021)***     (0.019) 
  
 
life_sat_more  0.076  sat_rem   0.056  fin_sat  0.032  card_use_pay  0.032 
  
 
   (0.015)***     (0.024)**     (0.021)     (0.087) 
  
 
help_in  0.069  sat_rem_more   0.097  fin_sat_more  0.068  card_use_both  -0.027 
  
 
   (0.015)***     (0.027)***     (0.022)***     (0.026) 
  
 
help_out  0.034  workfear_neutral   0.005  s_rich2  0.038  edu  0.036 
  
 





workfear   -0.022  s_rich3  0.056  finprof  0.024 
  
 
         (0.021)     (0.039)     (0.022) 
  
 
           s_resp2  0.027       
  
 
              (0.033)       
  
 
           s_resp3  0.037       
                     (0.035)       
sex  -0.022     -0.021    -0.027     -0.023    -0.019 
   (0.018)     (0.017)    (0.026)     (0.019)    (0.018) 
age  0.003     0.003    0.003     0.003    0.003 
   (0.000)***     (0.000)***    (0.001)***     (0.000)***    (0.000)*** 
rus  0.043     0.041    0.041     0.049    0.041 
   (0.015)***     (0.015)***    (0.021)*     (0.014)***    (0.015)*** 
married  0.037     0.017    0.014     0.027    0.037 
   (0.013)***     (0.014)    (0.018)     (0.014)*    (0.013)*** 
hh_size  -0.008     -0.000    -0.013     -0.007    -0.009 
   (0.005)*     (0.005)    (0.007)**     (0.005)    (0.005)* 
child  -0.029     -0.035    -0.021     -0.028    -0.028 
   (0.006)***     (0.007)***    (0.011)**     (0.007)***    (0.006)*** 
h_rooms  0.005     -0.000    -0.002     0.003    0.003 
   (0.006)     (0.006)    (0.010)     (0.007)    (0.007) 
rural  -0.014     -0.009    -0.035     -0.012    -0.001 
   (0.013)     (0.013)     (0.017)**     (0.014)     (0.014) 
N  3,777.000     3,746.000     1,931.000     3,587.000     3,777.000 
LR chi^2  114.665***     295.031***    300.211***     327.537***    280.249*** 
Preudo R^2  0.040     0.062     0.061     0.067     0.048 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01  
 
Table A2  Results: Crisis bank loans (probability, marginal effects) 
Variable  I  Variable  II  Variable  III  Variable  IV  Variable  V 
income  0.000  income  0.000  income  0.000  income  0.000  income  0.000 
   (0.000)     (0.000)     (0.000)*     (0.000)     (0.000) 
fin_nochange12  0.047  fin_nochange12  0.045  fin_nochange12  0.069  fin_nochange12  0.050  fin_nochange12  0.054 
   (0.021)**     (0.020)**     (0.031)**     (0.025)**     (0.022)** 
fin_better12  0.067  fin_better12  0.061  fin_better12  0.104  fin_better12  0.077  fin_better12  0.072 
   (0.025)***     (0.025)**     (0.036)***     (0.028)***     (0.026)*** 
     smart_same  0.040  wweek   0.003  sure_inc  -0.077  inet  0.003 
        (0.035)     (0.001)***     (0.037)**     (0.021) 
     smart_more  0.009  working_out  0.010  fin_nochange  0.026  gen_inv  -0.032 
        (0.053)     (0.057)     (0.022)     (0.092) 
     life_sat  0.019  ch_work   0.015  fin_better  0.043  card_use_cash  0.097 
        (0.023)     (0.035)     (0.022)*     (0.023)*** 
     life_sat_more  0.004  sat_rem   -0.030  fin_sat  -0.068  card_use_pay  0.423 
        (0.019)     (0.038)     (0.019)***     (0.128)*** 
     help_in  0.047  sat_rem_more   -0.029  fin_sat_more  -0.084  card_use_both  0.162 
        (0.019)**     (0.031)     (0.020)***     (0.044)*** 
     help_out  0.095  workfear_neutral   -0.018  s_rich2  0.032  edu  -0.008 
        (0.040)**     (0.042)     (0.021)     (0.016) 
           workfear   0.004  s_rich3  0.040  finprof  0.060 
              (0.034)     (0.044)     (0.028)** 
          
   
s_resp2  -0.017      
          
   
   (0.035)      
          
   
s_resp3  0.011      
          
   
   (0.034)      
sex  0.085     0.085     0.099     0.071     0.089 
   (0.020)***     (0.020)***    (0.040)**     (0.021)***    (0.020)*** 
age  -0.008     -0.008    -0.008     -0.007    -0.007 
   (0.001)***     (0.001)***    (0.001)***     (0.001)***    (0.001)*** 
rus  0.031     0.028    0.029     0.034    0.028 
   (0.029)     (0.028)    (0.039)     (0.030)    (0.029) 
married  0.056     0.045    0.079     0.052    0.055 
   (0.019)***     (0.018)**    (0.031)**     (0.020)***    (0.019)*** 
hh_size  0.030     0.034    0.016     0.025    0.032 
   (0.009)***     (0.009)***    (0.014)     (0.009)***    (0.009)*** 
child  0.025     0.021    0.045     0.030    0.022 
   (0.010)**     (0.010)**    (0.016)***     (0.010)***    (0.009)** 
h_rooms  0.014     0.013    0.005     0.013    0.011 
   (0.010)     (0.011)    (0.017)     (0.011)    (0.011) 
rural  -0.040     -0.038    -0.007     -0.033    -0.011 
   (0.033)     (0.032)     (0.058)     (0.034)     (0.033) 
N  3,777.000     3,746.000     1,931.000     3,587.000     3,777.000 
LR chi^2  1,619.170***     3,332.863***    266.841***     2,078.436***    2,405.767*** 
Preudo R^2  0.125     0.131     0.055     0.130     0.140 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Table A3  Results: Regressions with all independent variables 
Panel A: Marginal effects    Panel B: Linear effects (for amounts)  
Variable  savings  crisis 
savings  bank loans  crisis bank 
loans 
next-year 
borrowing    Variable  savings  crisis savings  bank loans  crisis bank 
loans 
income  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000    income  0.161  0.085  0.710  0.960 
   (0.000)**  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)       (0.108)  (0.065)  (0.231)***  (0.038)*** 
fin_nochange12  -0.058  -0.041  0.059  0.059  0.003   fin_nochange12  -1,645.206  -2,242.415  34,534.391  -32,229.987 
   (0.019)***  (0.019)**  (0.025)**  (0.025)**  (0.005)       (4,540.892)  (1,471.979)  (22,594.676)  (45,443.848) 
fin_better12  -0.017  0.008  0.085  0.085  0.003    fin_better12  -8,483.670  1,197.032  16,081.285  -23,925.537 
   (0.029)  (0.021)  (0.029)***  (0.029)***  (0.008)       (5,854.963)  (1,557.050)  (18,997.086)  (44,157.949) 
sex  -0.007  -0.022  0.076  0.076  -0.002    sex  -16,246.940  -980.252  -32,742.749  16,506.951 
   (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.021)***  (0.021)***  (0.006)       (9,852.134)*  (1,596.877)  (52,077.514)  (44,519.640) 
age  0.004  0.003  -0.007  -0.007  -0.001    age  249.577  -37.515  -77.675  27.684 
   (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.000)***       (193.581)  (87.507)  (519.161)  (669.381) 
rus  0.067  0.044  0.028  0.028  0.004    rus  -7,171.407  -5,790.641  -16,524.439  -12,863.536 
   (0.029)**  (0.013)***  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.006)       (7,621.520)  (4,761.736)  (27,358.933)  (29,446.138) 
married  0.051  0.017  0.040  0.040  0.006    married  -2,060.191  -753.839  35,302.868  1,917.268 
   (0.018)***  (0.015)  (0.019)**  (0.019)**  (0.005)       (4,765.617)  (1,728.529)  (12,907.490)*** (19,048.876) 
hh_size  -0.013  -0.003  0.032  0.032  -0.001    hh_size  1,903.122  1,528.460  -5,068.026  -2,823.035 
   (0.007)*  (0.005)  (0.009)***  (0.009)***  (0.002)       (1,837.415)  (1,229.663)  (6,061.865)  (14,610.430) 
child  -0.021  -0.032  0.022  0.022  0.007    child  -2,534.468  -292.140  -6,944.748  -23,476.082 
   (0.009)**  (0.007)***  (0.010)**  (0.010)**  (0.003)**       (2,215.789)  (1,127.000)  (5,589.132)  (14,922.094) 
h_rooms  -0.007  -0.001  0.010  0.010  -0.003    h_rooms  8,214.731  2,540.587  15,704.039  16,644.478 
   (0.010)  (0.006)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.002)       (3,791.672)**  (1,857.661)  (7,202.786)**  (16,078.365) 
rural  0.044  -0.005  -0.002  -0.002  -0.000    rural  -9,282.947  3,422.110  -44,009.213  -2,394.474 
   (0.028)  (0.015)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.006)       (5,969.912)  (1,445.583)** (17,889.622)**  (18,265.583) 
smart_same  0.024  0.016  0.043  0.043  0.005    smart_same  5,897.169  1,404.001  3,117.730  5,781.416 
   (0.027)  (0.021)  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.013)       (6,658.900)  (1,357.856)  (37,727.955)  (23,645.810) 
smart_more  0.156  0.060  0.004  0.004  0.010    smart_more  1,314.542  5,371.375  -27,778.404  46,996.585 
   (0.057)***  (0.041)  (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.020)       (7,690.320)  (2,794.082)*  (38,868.503)  (59,202.842) 
life_sat  0.063  0.015  0.028  0.028  -0.006    life_sat  5,224.851  1,306.076  27,796.711  6,481.053 
   (0.018)***  (0.017)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.005)       (4,713.926)  (1,323.384)  (15,586.892)*  (30,965.835) 
life_sat_more  0.033  0.026  0.013  0.013  -0.002    life_sat_more  -1,510.686  -126.882  44,734.349  19,027.199 
   (0.023)  (0.016)*  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.007)       (4,460.726)  (1,027.993)  (19,500.556)**  (45,933.542) 
help_in  0.090  0.056  0.043  0.043  0.012    help_in  8,086.566  1,337.083  -3,822.068  -12,515.828 
   (0.017)***  (0.014)***  (0.020)**  (0.020)**  (0.006)**       (4,829.179)*  (1,386.160)  (12,968.119)  (11,731.248) 
help_out  0.112  0.024  0.080  0.080  0.014    help_out  -859.382  2,491.344  1,046.879  -36,139.182 
   (0.029)***  (0.027)  (0.038)**  (0.038)**  (0.017)       (6,799.984)  (1,557.478)  (35,416.139)  (22,035.056) 
sure_inc  0.004  -0.009  -0.074  -0.074  -0.012    sure_inc  10,004.242  349.607  -3,554.463  -6,359.169 
   (0.030)  (0.023)  (0.036)**  (0.036)**  (0.010)       (5,379.557)*  (1,584.036)  (26,918.709)  (17,459.122) 
fin_nochange  0.047  0.053  0.020  0.020  0.001    fin_nochange  -5,484.816  1,161.800  -56,940.632  9,430.536 
   (0.022)**  (0.016)***  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.007)       (6,409.745)  (1,855.961)  (39,997.447)  (24,747.324) 
fin_better  0.100  0.106  0.030  0.030  0.017    fin_better  422.212  -173.293  -75,666.178  -4,394.198 
   (0.024)***  (0.022)***  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.010)*       (8,683.540)  (2,201.610)  (40,991.189)*  (30,775.769) 
fin_sat  0.036  0.026  -0.070  -0.070  0.000    fin_sat  12,940.198  3,260.541  3,127.201  -11,181.087 
   (0.025)  (0.020)  (0.018)***  (0.018)***  (0.007)       (7,749.487)*  (1,780.908)*  (16,361.936)  (24,992.150) 
fin_sat_more  0.050  0.055  -0.086  -0.086  -0.007    fin_sat_more  23,593.185  2,440.867  30,617.496  57,284.790 
   (0.024)**  (0.022)**  (0.020)***  (0.020)***  (0.005)       (7,932.774)*** (1,320.909)*  (26,498.798)  (54,074.961) 
s_rich2  0.023  0.029  0.017  0.017  0.003    s_rich2  5,628.519  -772.165  17,027.319  -833.871 
   (0.023)  (0.013)**  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.007)       (4,352.386)  (1,188.819)  (12,190.954)  (24,690.914) 
s_rich3  0.030  0.036  0.025  0.025  -0.003    s_rich3  10,378.805  6,461.692  33,369.305  -59,208.627 
   (0.047)  (0.035)  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.009)       (10,765.221)  (5,929.376)  (60,084.529)  (39,354.154) 
s_resp2  -0.022  0.024  -0.026  -0.026  -0.011    s_resp2  -5,300.378  -326.777  -27,701.184  14,812.271 
   (0.039)  (0.034)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.011)       (7,040.579)  (2,030.876)  (22,469.272)  (23,761.681) 
s_resp3  -0.003  0.025  -0.003  -0.003  -0.006    s_resp3  -1,458.866  1,379.463  -39,829.392  29,355.703 
   (0.038)  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.010)       (7,427.456)  (1,660.736)  (24,370.774)  (30,518.120) 
inet  0.023  0.016  0.002  0.002  0.002    inet  6,277.393  -2,205.408  4,734.184  27,370.184 
   (0.021)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.007)       (8,101.670)  (1,930.901)  (13,842.550)  (31,433.464) 
gen_inv  0.222  0.114  -0.034  -0.034  0.031    gen_inv  43,913.810  29,732.934  -20,940.259  0.000 
   (0.104)**  (0.082)  (0.093)  (0.093)  (0.029)       (26,644.230)* (16,561.029)*  (76,274.084)  (0.000) 
card_use_cash  0.032  0.013  0.090  0.090  0.012    card_use_cash  9,411.050  664.871  14,641.103  -3,522.797 
   (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.023)***  (0.023)***  (0.006)**       (3,630.316)***  (1,398.691)  (20,369.371)  (19,111.373) 
card_use_pay  0.006  0.046  0.396  0.396  0.094    card_use_pay  -20,470.821  6,559.879  -23,923.191  2,643.647 
   (0.096)  (0.086)  (0.132)***  (0.132)***  (0.066)       (15,532.917)  (4,660.482)  (35,328.156)  (42,072.773) 
card_use_both  -0.065  -0.037  0.171  0.171  0.026    card_use_both  5,645.624  -858.481  34,314.360  -39,974.145 
   (0.023)***  (0.021)*  (0.046)***  (0.046)***  (0.012)**       (14,035.715)  (1,900.515)  (23,744.837)  (36,215.993) 
edu  0.036  0.020  -0.006  -0.006  0.004    edu  21,886.638  -2,075.639  47,819.725  -67,364.836 
   (0.017)**  (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.005)       (8,096.613)***  (2,032.233)  (19,015.960)** (36,706.119)* 
finprof  -0.003  0.009  0.054  0.054  0.004    finprof  -13,921.682  1,972.874  -12,481.699  8,422.320 
   (0.027)  (0.022)  (0.027)**  (0.027)**  (0.009)       (5,655.728)**  (1,627.020)  (16,912.745)  (34,035.251) 
N  3,560.000  3,560.000  3,560.000  3,560.000  3,560.000    const  5,979.193  -196.043  124,581.155  29,135.426 
LR chi^2  1,519.011*** 3,828.079*** 12,600.097*** 12,600.097*** 1,944.021***      (20,810.691)  (8,266.817)  (81,479.457)  (71,794.271) 
Preudo R^2  0.083  0.081  0.149  0.149  0.108    AthRho   -0.149     -0.047    
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01       (0.056)***     (0.028)*    
              N  3,731.000  462.000  4,455.000  98.000 
              Chi^2     0.369***  .  0.757***  Earlier BOFIT Discussion Papers 
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